Sophie--Chatper XXV--Kant

I. HILDE TALKS TO HER FATHER ON THE PHONE ABOUT WHETHER SOPHIE EXITS. NOTICE HER COMPASSION FOR SOPHIE (HUME-LIKE), AND HER SPECULATION THAT SHE MIGHT BE "INSIDE A PICTURE HANGING ON THE WALL OF THE LITTLE CABIN..." (P. 319). OBVIOUSLY, HILDE BELIEVES SOPHIE THAT BECAUSE SHE IS MADE UP (CREATED) BY HER FATHER, SHE IS REAL. CHECK ARISTOTLE'S POETICS.

II. WHAT DOES KANT DO FOR SOPHIE AND HILDE THAT REALLY HAD BEEN MISSING UP TO THIS POINT? -- (1724 -1804). THE RED SUNGLASSES IS AN IMPORTANT METAPHOR.

A. KANT WAS A DEVOUT CHRISTIAN; WHAT ARE THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS? (THERE IS A DUALISM HE HAD TO CONFRONT THAT BOTH PLEASED AND FRUSTRATED THE ROMANTICS AND NEOCLASSICISTS).

B. DUTY ETHICS--AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE IMPERATIVE WERE APPLIED TO SOPHIE'S EXISTENCE? HOW ABOUT HILDE'S?

C. SYNTHESIZED THE RATIONALISTIC: (Descartes & Spinoza) AND EMPIRICIST TRADITION: (Locke, Berkeley, Hume: )

III. THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION IN PHILOSOPHY (P. 323) REDEFINED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC STATEMENTS.

It has hitherto been assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects a priori, by means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge, have been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. This appears, at all events, to accord better with the possibility of our gaining the end we have in view, that is to say, of arriving at the cognition of objects a priori, of determining something with respect to these objects, before they are given to us. We here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge. Now as I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but- if they are to become cognitions- must refer them, as representations, to something, as object, and must determine the latter by means of the former, here again there are two courses open to me. Either, first, I may assume that the conceptions, by which I effect this determination, conform to the object- and in this case I am reduced to the same perplexity as before; or secondly, I may assume that the objects, or, which is the same thing, that experience, in which alone as given objects they are cognized, conform to my conceptions- and then I am at no loss how to proceed. For experience itself is a mode of cognition which requires understanding. Before objects, are given to me, that is, a priori, I must presuppose in myself laws of the understanding which are expressed in conceptions a priori. To these conceptions, then, all the objects of experience must necessarily conform. Now there are objects which reason thinks, and that necessarily, but which cannot be given in experience, or, at least, cannot be given so as reason thinks them. The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish an excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted, and which is based on the principle that we only cognize in things a priori that which we ourselves place in them.

Now all experience contains, besides the intuition of the senses through which an object is given, a conception also of an object that is given in intuition. Accordingly, conceptions of objects in general must lie as a priori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition; and consequently, the objective validity of the categories, as a priori conceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (as far as regards the form of thought) is possible only by their means. For in that case they apply necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, because only through them can an object of experience be thought. The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all a priori conceptions is to show that these conceptions are a priori conditions of the possibility of all experience. Conceptions which afford us the objective foundation of the possibility of experience are for that very reason necessary.

IV. ANALYSIS: Using the above, does the world exist exactly as we perceive it, or does it exist the way it appears to our reason?

A. KANT SAW BOTH VIEWS AS EXTREME, AND WANTED TO KNOW IF SYNTHETIC STATEMENTS COULD BE A PRIORI, AND HIS ANSWER IS THE 'COPERNICAN REVOLUTION' IN PHILOSOPHY"

B. WE BEGIN WITH SENSE PERCEPTION, BUT OUR MIND PLAYS A MAJOR ROLE IN ITS ORDERING, MAKING THE MIND ACTIVE IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROCESS, AND ISN'T THAT WHAT HILDE'S DAD WANTS HIS DAUGHTER TO DO?

A. TIME AND SPACE PRECEDE SENSE DATA (OPERATE A PRIORI); THEY ARE MODES OF PERCEPTION, [COORDINATING POWER] AND NOT ATTRIBUTES OF SENSE PERCEPTION. THE PERCEPTIONS ARE CLASSIFIED AND ANALYZED BY THE CATEGORIES, SO THE MIND IS NOT PASSIVE--I.E., JUST A "BLANK SLATE."

B. THE CATEGORIES OF THE MIND INCLUDING SINGULARITY, PLURALITY, CAUSE / EFFECT ORDER THE SENSE WORLD, SO WE CANNOT REALLY KNOW A 'THING IN ITSELF' BUT ONLY AS THE MIND PERCEIVES.


*CATEGORIES OF THE MIND exist a priori of sense experience and order it:*
				FUSION OF: DESCARTES--RATIONALISM-INNATE KNOWLEDGE -- LOCKE --EMPIRICISM-MIND IS A BLANK SLATE--RECEIVES SENSE DATA

	plurality negation limitation necessity unity	limitation existence substance possibility interaction

			EXAMPLE: THE CAR (SENSE WORLD) HIT (CATEGORY) THE TREE (SENSE WORLD)

C. KANT THOUGHT THAT THE RATIONALISTS HAD FORGOTTEN THE IMPORTANCE OF SENSE EXPERIENCE, AND THE EMPIRICISTS THE ROLE OF THE MIND (P. 323).

VI. HUMAN REASON PERCEIVES EVERYTHING AS A MATTER OF CAUSE AND EFFECT

A. WE MAKES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ‘THINGS IN THEMSELVES’ AND THINGS AS THEY APPEAR TO US.

B. WE CAN ONLY KNOW HOW THINGS APPEAR TO USE, BECAUSE IN THE ACT OF PERCEIVING ‘X’, ‘X’ IS CHANGED.

C. HUMANS HAVE AN IDEA OF HOW EXPERIENCE WILL BE ORDERED SINCE WE KNOW SOMETHING OF HOW THE MIND OPERATES: (P. 322)

VII. WHAT CAN REASON DETERMINE BEYOND WHAT REASON IS CAPABLE OF DETERMINING? IF KANT'S PREMISE IS OUR INABILITY TO KNOW REALITY PER SE, SINCE THE MIND FILTERS AND TRANSFORMS EXPERIENCE, WHAT IS HAPPENING TO HILDE, AND WHO IS DIRECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF HER MIND? IS SHE FREE? NOTE HER JOURNEY, HER QUEST, SYNTHESIZES EMPIRICISM (EXPERIENCE DERIVED), AND RATIONALISM (THE POWER OF THE MIND TO TRANSFORM THAT EXPERIENCE).

VIII. THE ETHICS OF KANT BASED ON REASON: THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE...

A. PRACTICAL REASON--THE INTELLIGENCE THAT ALLOWS US TO DISCERN WHAT IS RIGHT AND WRONG IN EVERY CASE.

B. THIS IS INNATE (P. 330) RECALLING DESCARTES.

C. ‘ACT AS IF THE MAXIM OF YOUR ACTION WERE TO BECOME THROUGH YOUR WILL A UNIVERSAL LAW OF NATURE, THEREFORE, HUMANITY IS AN END; NOT A MEANS, AND WE DO HAVE A CONSCIENCE.

D. DUTY / ETHICS--IT IS A MORAL IMPERATIVE TO ACT IN SUCH AND SUCH A WAY SO THAT SOMEONE BENEFITS? WHAT IF THE RESULTS ARE NOT WHAT THE INITIATOR INTENDED?

E. WE ARE ACTING FREELY WHEN WE OBEY--obey what?

IX. HUMAN NATURE AND FREEDOM:

A. MATERIAL--WE CANNOT ALWAYS CONTROL WHAT WE PERCEIVE

B. REASON--THE ORDERING POWER OF THE MIND INDEPENDENT OF SENSE PERCEPTION:

C. KANT AND COLERIDGE AND THE ROLE OF THE IMAGINATION--THE PRELUDE TO ROMANTICISM- WE WILL NOTE THAT THE ROMANTICS AND KANT WILL NOT COMPLETELY AGREE.

X. WOULD SOPHIE AND HILDE ACCEPT KANT'S BELIEF THAT, ‘TWO THINGS FILL MY MIND WITH AWE...THE STARRY HEAVENS ABOVE, AND THE MORAL LAW WITHIN ME.”

XII. DO YOU SEE ANY PROBLEMS WITH KANT'S "REVOLUTION" SYNTHESIZING EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM?

XI. SOPHIE AND ALBERTO:

A. ALBERTO ASKS IF SHE BELIEVES EVERYTHING SHE SEES? (P. 333).

B. ALBERTO (WITH THE MAJOR'S PERMISSION?) ARGUES THAT WHAT APPEARS -BE IT RED RIDING HOOD OR WINNIE -THE - POOH MAY BE BUT PRELUDES TO THE ETHEREAL DESIGNED BY THE MAJOR TO TRICK. WOULD TOLKIEN AND THE ROMANTICS ACCEPT THE CONCLUSION THAT "PHILOSOPHY IS THE OPPOSITE OF FAIRY TALES?" RECALL THAT TOLKIEN EQUATED MYTH AND TRUTH.

C. EXAMINE KEATS' EVE OF ST. AGNES: FANTASY IS SAID TO HOODWINK, AND THE URN "TEASES US OUT OF THOUGHT." WHY? HOW?

XII. SOPHIE MEETS WINNIE-THE-POO ON THE WAY HOME (P. 335)

A. HILDE-THROUGH-THE-LOOKING-GLASS

B. LETTER FROM DAD VIA. POO:

1. KANT AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

2. USING REASON TO ORDER THE WORLD TO BRING ABOUT PEACE....

KANT'S 'Copernician revolution" cannot be underestimated. Although his writings are much more difficult to read that Plato's, he may indeed by the most brilliant philosopher since Greek's golden age, and certainly the depth of Kant's thought rivals that of Plato. Kant at least...

rescued philosophy from the rationalist / empiricist controversy
responded to and refuted Hume's skepticism
made Greek, Medieval / Christian, and Renaissance thought compatible
achieved an epistemological synthesis that the defined the operations of the mind in relation to the sense world
became the most important transition figure from the neoclassical period to the romantic period
developed a code of ethics that made Christianity compatible with scientific thought.

SOURCES:

As with any philosopher, nothing can or should replace the primary sources. One should consult The Critique of Pure Reason. See: Supplementary Readings.

As with Aristotle, however, the language and complexity of Kant's thought require that secondary sources be consulted concurrently. See:

Durant, W. The Story of Philosophy. N.Y,: Pocket Book, 1957.

Levine, T.Z. From Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophic Quest. N.Y.: Bantam, 1989.{Our supplementary text}

Windelband, W. A History of Philosophy. 2Vols. N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1958.

Web Sites:

Kant: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

An Overview of the Critique of Pure Reason

A Glossary of philosophical terms used by Kant (Complied by Palmquist)


	IN THEORY... SOPHIE RECEIVES IMPRESSIONS FROM THE SENSE WORLD [INTUITIONS], SHE THEN FORMS CONCEPTS--ACTIVE SYNTHESIS [BY THE IMAGINATION OR REASON], AND THE TRANSCENDENCE CONTINUES SO THAT BY REASON IDEAS ARE FORMED, and JUDGMENTS ARE MADE. THIS PROCESS INVOLVES THE ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC OPERATION OF THE MIND--[A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI]